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Abstract – Successful or not? Evidence, emergence and development 
management. 
This article offers a critique of the dominant ways of conceiving of, managing and 
evaluating development. It argues that these management methods constrain  
the exploration of novelty and difference. By drawing on insights from the 
complexity sciences, particularly the theory of emergence, the article calls for a 
broadening of our understanding of how social change comes about. Arguing that 
the domain of development is not a narrow technical discipline, but an intensely 
social and political practice of mutual recognition, this article calls for a greater 
focus on power and processes of relating as they affect local interaction between 
people. 
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Successful or not? Evidence, emergence and development management. 
 
This article will explore some of the concepts that underpin the management of 
international development as a way into enquiring into theories of method, 
knowledge and evidence. In doing so it will describe what it is that staff in INGOs 
actually do when they are working, and what theories they take up in their 
practice. This will involve narrating an episode in the life of an organisation and 
thereafter generalising from it. In generalising the article makes no claims that 
the sector is homogenous, and in particularising it makes no claims that this 
particular example is typical of all INGOs. What is of interest is the generative 
tension between the two, a tension we will call dialectic. The article will go on to 
explore this nexus, how the general arises from the particular, by drawing on 
analogies from the complexity sciences. It will set this out in contrast to the way 
that generalisations and global patterns are usually thought to arise, particularly 
according to theories currently in use in the international aid sector. 
 
Narrative as a research method 
The international development domain is no different from many others, being 
awash with tools, grids and frameworks, generalised recipes for how to undertake 
the work. What is often lacking in the literature is a description of what actually 
happens when staff take up these ideas in their daily practice and how they affect 
what is possible to achieve. What practical sense do staff make of project cycle 
management, logical frameworks (LF), performance management, and how 
helpful are they?  
 
This article contends that the grids and frameworks currently in use in most 
INGOs are abstractions from a rich hinterland of lived experience: they are 
simplifications, sometimes reductively so. They are representations of reality, but 
ones which can cover over the messy business of trying to square experience 
with theory. Rather than merely reflect experience, when taken up uncritically by 
staff in INGOs they actively shape reality as the abstractions take on a life of their 
own. How staff take up conventional methods of working directly affects what it is 
possible to achieve. 
 
In order to explore this phenomenon, the way that conventional methods are 
taken up, how would one give an account of what happens in organisations as 
staff engage with each other to particularise these abstract ways of knowing? 
Increasingly in organisational literature qualitative methods, particularly those 
using narrative, are accepted as a valid research method (Stacey: 2007; 
Czarniawska: 2004; Tsoukas and Hatch: 2002). The advantages of narratives are 
that they can weave together abstract concepts, subjectivity, feelings and 
ambiguity into a particular context with particular agents who act within a 
temporal structure. Narrative can provoke many resonances in the reader and 
stimulate them to make their own connections and associations with their own 
lived experience. Narrative is a very common but often neglected form of 
meaning making. Stacey (2007) makes the claim that the everyday process of 
organising with other involves the patterning and repatterning of narratives that 
describe organisational life. Organisations, as the ethnomethodologist Deirdre 
Boden (1994) would have it, continuously arise out of people talking about what 
they are doing, and the ongoing sense they make of this together. Although they 
share some of the same characteristics, narratives are distinct from both stories, 
which are fictional, and case studies, which are more tailored and crafted 
accounts of particular episodes of organisational life often used in business 
schools to demonstrate a pre-reflected pedagogical point. Instead, narratives are 
intended to reflect some of the messy, open-ended and ambiguous nature of 
experience, and it is on this complexity that this article turns.  
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Narrative - how schemes of thought shape the work 
I have been invited to work with a senior management team in a country in Africa 
because they are deemed not be working as well as they might be. There have 
been low level conflicts between individuals on the senior management team, 
there is not a great deal of critical enquiry into the work, but in general and more 
or less the team is doing what it is supposed to be doing and meeting donors‟ 
expectations. After my first visit to the team I tell my contractor that I think this 
team shapes up well in comparison with many teams I have worked with.  
 
We agree a second visit and discuss a programme of work. As way of 
demonstrating my particular method I suggested that I attend one of their 
routine three day quarterly management meetings as a participant. Thereafter we 
would find the time to talk about what we thought was going on there as a way of 
enquiring into practice. 
 
The first two days were spent reviewing the different projects that this INGO was 
managing in country. Each presentation was almost the same. It consisted in the 
presenter, usually the manager of that particular project, showing a slide of the 
aims and objectives of the project, then going on to show in subsequent slides 
whether the objectives and milestones had or had not been fulfilled. The 
dominant way of understanding the work was as progress against pre-reflected 
targets. This often led the presenter into a review of future targets, the possible 
impediments to achieving them, and how these contraints might be managed 
away. Usually there was a brief five or ten minutes set aside for discussion at the 
end of the presentation before we moved onto the next, which was given in 
almost exactly the same way.  
 
The organisation I was working for was obliged to construe its projects with the 
LF in order to get funds from donors. Managers also operate a performance 
management process based on setting annual objectives. The organisation 
employs committed workers who are keen to succeed and do well at their jobs 
and it was interesting to notice the kinds of dualistic thinking that these ways of 
working were leading to in the workshop where I was a participant: I was 
constantly being asked to help participants „correct their mistakes‟, to help them 
stop doing what was „wrong‟ and start doing what was „right‟. Objectives were 
either achieved or not achieved, projects were either on target, or, very often, 
close to it. What I noticed was a lack of discussion, moreover and absence of 
argument and debate. Professionalism in this context was understood to be about 
conforming to what was expected and predicted, very little about being surprised. 
 
Locating this article in development literature 
The above narrative might be deemed an extreme example, but nonetheless it 
falls broadly within the author‟s experience during 15 years of offering 
consultancy to INGOs. There is a growing literature critical of what we might term 
managerialist approaches to development management, which draw on a range 
of abstract instruments and schemes such as the LF, project cycle, strategic 
planning, performance management and others. Dar and Cooke, 2008; Wallace et 
al., 2006,1997; Quarles van Ufford and Giri, 2003; Eyben, 2005, 2006; Mosse, 
2005; Mosse and Lewis, 2005 variously understand managerialism, a body of 
theories which idealise the role of manager in organisational life, to be a legacy of 
colonialism, an extension of global capitalism, or a reduced and unproblematic 
manifestation of modernity. There have also been a number of interesting studies 
which explore how development interventions cover over politics and represent 
social struggle as a series of discrete projectised problems in need of technical 
solutions from development organisations (Li, 2007; Dichter, 2003; Mitchell, 
2002; Ferguson, 1990). All concern themselves with the implied power relations 
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between those who work in the aid domain and those whose lives they seek to 
affect. 
 
This article broadly accepts these critiques of contemporary development 
management, and also agrees with the idea that in subscribing to a narrow 
technical and rational discourse, staff in INGOs contribute to the covering over of 
contestability and conflict. However, the approach in this article will be to engage 
more fully with the conceptual underpinnings of what we are terming 
managerialism, sometimes New Public Management, and in doing so it will 
investigate how it affects the day to day practice of staff who interact with 
development beneficiaries. Rather than concentrating on a broad canvas, 
however, the article will focus instead on the local relationships of power that 
arise between colleagues. In drawing on more radical manifestations of 
complexity theory, it will argue that it is in this daily, local communicative 
interaction that opportunities for radical transformation and knowledge arise. 
What development staff choose to talk about with others, and what they pay 
attention to, will profoundly affect how knowledge arises and how they evaluate 
the success of what they are doing. 
 
This article will show briefly the ways in which the dominance of managerialism 
arose and persists and will then go on to argue how a greater understanding of 
emergence might open development practitioners up to an appreciation of 
pluralism which their habituated practice may have led them to cover over. The 
article will make the case that there is no inherent contradiction between 
scientific method and contestability, and that it is in the local interactions 
between engaged colleagues that opportunities for exploration of novelty arise. 
 
Borrowing scientific language - how managerialism came to dominate 
Broadly there are three reasons for the ascendancy of managerialism. 
 
Firstly, previous articles (Mowles: 2008a, 2008b) have described how INGOs have 
imported management theories largely uncritically from the private sector, and 
how the majority of these theories are underpinned by systems thinking. The LF, 
the project cycle, performance management, even many ways of developing 
strategy often rely upon assumptions explicit in cybernetics (Wiener, 1948). 
These are based in concepts of linearity, predictability and control, that it is 
possible to set goals in advance of undertaking the work and through a series of 
interventions aimed at correcting deviations from the desired path, to achieve the 
intended outcome.  
 
When using modelling techniques and frameworks based in systems approaches, 
modern management theories adopt the language of scientific method, and in 
doing so lay claim to a more reality convergent way of dealing with organisational 
problems. Adherents of theories of systemic management are setting out a 
particular discourse which competes with existing ways of understanding 
management practice, which Lewis (2001) has argued have been historically 
weak in the international development sector.  
 
Aspirations to scientific method and rationality in modern management theory are 
often explicit and are reflected in the use of vocabulary, although the if-then 
causality and systemic theories of change are usually implicit. There are also 
explicit attempts directly to bring over disciplines from the natural sciences 
through a relatively recent turn to „evidence based management‟ (Pfeffer and 
Sutton, 2006; Rousseau, 2006). Rousseau draws on an analogy with medicine as 
a „success story‟ in her article advocating for evidence-based management and 
sums up the key concepts of what evidence-based practice would look like: 
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 learning about cause-effect connections in professional practices; 
 isolating the variations that measurably affect desired outcomes; 
 creating a culture of evidence-based decision-making and research 
participation. (Rousseau, 2006: 259-260) 
 
For Pfeffer and Sutton it is possible to find out unproblematic facts about mergers 
and acquisitions or management practice, and to apply these facts in one‟s own 
organisation as way of „driving up performance‟. 
 
The second reason for the domination of systemic ways of managing is the 
dimension of power-relating: they allow administrators, whether they be 
managers within the INGO themselves sitting at HQ, or bureaucrats sitting within 
funding organisations, to „see like a state‟ (Scott, 1998). With a simplified 
summary of what it is that the project intends the work is thought to be more 
„transparent„ at a distance, and thus project workers more „accountable‟.  
 
Thirdly, as argued in a previous article (Mowles, 2007) drawing on Bourdieu 
(1991), international development is a highly professionalised practice, „a field of 
specialised production‟, where the players have a large stake in the game, and in 
which they are completely absorbed. Many INGOs are obliged to take up the LFA 
to get funding, but others adopt it because everyone else, including those with 
high social capital in this particular game, is adopting it. The dynamic of the game 
is self-reinforcing. From an institutional theory perspective, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1987) reach a similar conclusion, that organisations are more likely to adopt a 
way of managing because of the pressure of others adopting them, rather than 
because there is evidence of their effectiveness, despite the recent turn to 
evidence-based management. 
 
So for at least these three reasons systemic management methods taken up by 
advocates of managerialism have come to dominate in the sector. In a very real 
sense, systemic management methods have come to take an ideological hold on 
the practice of development management and thus make certain ways of seeing 
and knowing more difficult. People try to fit their development experience within 
abstract and reductive schemes of thought and consider this the most important 
thing they are doing, rather than considering the messy day to day reality of 
trying to go on with others as being the data from which theories about the world 
emerge. 
 
Investigating the claims of evidence-based management 
What does it mean to be evidence-based as far as the management of 
development is concerned, and how relevant are analogies made with evidence-
based medicine, for example? 
 
In an interesting article following through the implementation of some policy 
directives on the treatment of glue ear in the National Health Service (NHS), 
Dopson (2005) treats the way that policy recommendations based on evidence-
based medicine were taken up in four NHS hospitals and the surrounding GP 
surgeries that served them. She found that amongst the different clinical groups 
who were involved in the treatment of glue ear, GPs, Health Visitors, audiologists, 
ENT surgeons, there was an acceptance of the recommendations of evidence 
based medicine in theory (that in this disease, „watchful waiting‟ is preferable to 
surgery), but in practice each of the different professional groups had a greater or 
lesser inclination to follow policy advice.  
 
Dopson explains the uneven and episodic take-up of the new policy directives by 
drawing on the process sociology of Norbert Elias (2000). For, Elias the 
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development of societies, the civilising process as he called it, arises from the 
constantly fluctuating asymmetric power relations between people:  
 
 Whether power differentials are large or small, balances of power are 
always present wherever there is a functional interdependence between 
people. (1978: 75) 
 
Elias makes the case that we are governed as much by our feelings as we are by 
rationality: both arise together in our relationships with others. We approach sets 
of problems cognitively, but at the same time are caught up in what we are doing 
as our identities are called into question and our relationships of power with 
others fluctuate. For Elias it would be impossible to think scientifically about 
human relating without acknowledging the interweaving of rational and affective 
selves which arises out of a specific history of interactions, and leads to a further 
patterning of interactions. He was deeply critical of sociological approaches which 
described social processes as though they were in a reduced and fixed state. 
Rather, he thought of the relations between people as being in a constant process 
of flux and change. 
 
There are many similar examples in the development literature, particularly those 
written from an anthropological perspective (Mosse, 2005; Crewe and Harrison, 
1998; Grillo and Stirrat, 1997), which document the conflicts that arise as 
seemingly rational endeavours become the locus of struggle and contestation 
between the different groups engaged in trying to undertake them. For example, 
in a chapter that deals directly with what is and is not measurable called The 
Character of Calculability, Mitchell (2002) describes how the apparently technical 
practice of mapping Egypt‟s agricultural land to develop a cadastral survey at the 
beginning of the 20th C was buffeted by politics: inter-departmental rivalries in 
the civil service, complaints, subversion, and disputes by and between farmers, 
and by the constantly fluctuating course of the Nile and the changing patterns of 
land ownership. Mitchell concludes that „expert knowledge works to format social 
relations, never simply to report or picture them‟ (2002: 118). The process of 
abstracting, reducing and simplifying, to enable managers sitting at a distance to 
presume the ability to predict and control, is nonetheless subverted on a daily 
basis through the practice of engaged social actors. 
 
Summary of the argument so far 
This article started with a justification of narrative as a research method as a 
means of finding out how INGO staff take up conventional management methods 
in practice, and described the author‟s involvement with a team in Africa. It 
depicted how each manager chose to talk about what they were responsible for 
using the tools and frameworks which are ubiquitous in the sector and how this 
had encouraged a much reduced discussion, often expressed in dualisms, about 
whether practice was correct or incorrect, on course or not on course. There was 
little opportunity for shared meaning-making. The article then set out an 
explanation of how these particular ways of managing the work were replicated 
and sustained in the international development domain, and the ideological 
impact that they had. The case was made that contemporary management theory 
borrows the vocabulary of empirical science, and in doing so covers over some of 
the discussion that might be had about power, values and difference. By 
intimation, then the article argues that this way of working privileges theories of 
control and manipulation and tilts power towards donors and centrally-based 
managers at the same time as pretending not to do so. By drawing on Dopson, 
Elias and Mitchell we are beginning to make an alternative argument that, despite 
the case sometimes made that technical and rational methods afford greater 
detachment, those using them will always get caught up in conflictual social 
processes which they will help form, and will be formed by at the same time. 
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The arguments set out above are not making an argument for being anti-
scientific or anti-rational. Rather, they are beginning to set out how current 
managerialist thinking is not scientific and rational enough, if we can take a broad 
understanding of rationality to include our acceptance of both our subjective and 
objective selves, and the way that conflict, difference and power relations affect 
what it is we are doing and the way we are doing it. 
 
The battle over being scientific 
The dispute as to what we might mean by natural science methods, and if we 
could define them, how far they might apply in the social sphere has been termed 
by Flyvbjerg (2001) the „paradigm wars‟. Flyvbjerg understands the two methods 
to be grounded in very different ways of understanding the world, and sees no 
way forward but to separate them: 
 
Just as social science has not been able to contribute with Kuhnian normal 
science and predictive theory to scientific development, so natural science 
has had little to offer to the reflexive analysis of goals values and interests 
that is a precondition for and enlightened development in any society. 
(2005: 53) 
 
Flyvbjerg‟s argument, drawing on Aristotle, is that there is a difference between 
value rationality, which considers matters of social value, and instrumental 
rationality, which is more concerned with problem solving. He makes the case 
that in modernity we have taken a rationalist turn and that the latter instrumental 
rationality has come to dominate. It was Aristotle‟s view that questions about 
who we are and what we value should always precede scientific enquiry so that 
we never become a society of ends without means. For this reason, Flyvbjerg 
states, we should abandon the project of trying to reconcile the two and develop 
research methods with particular relevance to the social and political nature of 
human interaction. In highlighting the case for putting power at the centre of 
social research, Flyvbjerg overstates the case for splitting the social and natural 
worlds. 
 
The sociologist Anthony Giddens (1993) makes a similar binary case, though 
negatively, arguing that we should resist the „hegemonic claims‟ from both the 
natural scientists and those who would oppose them for understanding social 
phenomena: 
 
It is necessary, in fact, to resist the claim to universality, with regard to 
the explanation of human conduct, of the two major competing traditions 
of philosophy: hermeneutics and positivism. Each aspires to cover the 
whole range of human behaviour, to accommodate it to its particular 
logical scheme. (1993:65) 
 
Giddens is helpful in his assertion that truth can be found in neither one nor the 
other set of methods, but may also be posing an unnecessary dualism. Neither 
positivism nor hermeneutics is monolithic. The sociologist Patrick Baert (2005) 
and Bruno Latour (2000) have separately argued this case. It is not possible to 
argue that natural and social science methods are interchangeable, or even that 
they are becoming more like each other, but it is possible say that they share 
things in common and are more nuanced than a reduced view would allow. Baert, 
for example, puts forward the idea that the term scientific method is inadequate, 
since it covers a multiplicity of methods: 
 
Different disciplines in the natural sciences function according to very 
different procedures unless the logic of inquiry is spelled out at such a 
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high level that it loses any meaning. It becomes increasingly apparent 
that those who believe in this unifying methodology erroneously 
generalize from a few sub-disciplines (mainly in physics) in which the 
procedures apply. (2005: 148) 
 
There are dangers, then, in generalising about what we might mean by scientific 
method. Equally, positivism and hermeneutics share some similar characteristics. 
 
Gadamer (1975) one of the hermeneutic philosophers to whom Giddens refers, 
points to the Socratic process of questioning, the opening up to otherness, of 
continuing to expand one‟s argument and one‟s horizon. Questioning is not about 
being in control but about being increasingly undogmatic and questioning further: 
 
The art of questioning is the art of questioning further i.e., the art of 
thinking. It is called dialectic because it is the art of conducting a real 
dialogue. (1993: 360/361) 
 
This is not to say that Gadamer is uninterested in truth, merely that he is less 
interested in truth as an end point rather than as an ongoing cycle of enquiry. 
Drawing on Socrates and Hegel, he believes that knowledge arises in the process 
of question and answer in a way that is driven by the movement between 
engaged discussants. It is a process of dialectic, and one might make the case 
that this is exactly the same process that takes place between engaged scientists 
and as they contest each others‟ findings and thought moves as a consequence. 
 
The next section will explore further this continuous questioning to which we have 
been referring, the Socratic process of enquiring, then enquiring further. It will do 
so by drawing on the scientific concept of emergence, which we will investigate 
below. The emergence of the patterning of relationships that arises from 
continuous interaction throws into question causality, truth and knowledge and 
poses a fundamental challenge to the common frameworks for understanding the 
management of development, which, as we have seen in the narrative, directly 
affect the way that many staff in INGOs go about their business. Instead of 
suggesting, a reduced and binary world, successful/unsuccessful, achieved/not 
achieved, theories of emergence promote a rigorous and continuous enquiry into 
the complex interplay of local activity and theorising from activity to encourage a 
richer, shared world of meaning. 
 
Emergence as mathematical modelling 
Peter Hedström is a mathematician working at Oxford University who has 
developed agent-based computer techniques for modelling complex social 
phenomena. In his book Dissecting the Social (2005) he explains the factors he 
has taken into account in developing a computer programme to model the 
behaviour of unemployed young people in Stockholm. Since he is dealing with 
non-linear equations, which have no solution, he is explicit that what he is doing 
offers explanations of what has happened, rather than predictions of what will 
happen. 
 
Hedström aspires to pure Platonic mathematical abstraction, balanced with a 
sense of what he calls realism, to develop sociology as a „rigorous science.‟ For 
him qualitative methods lack the generalizability and reliability of agent based 
modelling. He acknowledges the shortcomings of running experiments on a 
computer, since they are the laboratory equivalent of scientific research which 
does not take place in the real world, but nonetheless he stands by his method as 
one which applies formal scientific principles.  
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Having developed his model of the behaviour of young employed people and 
having run it thousands of times to mimic the behaviour of individuals in society 
he goes on to derive the following lessons: 
 
One such lesson was that the structure of social interaction can often be of 
considerable explanatory importance in its own right. Small and seemingly 
unimportant changes in the structure of social interaction can have a 
profound impact on the social outcomes which emerge. This also means 
that the effect a given action has on the social can be highly contingent 
upon the structural configuration in which the actor is embedded. (2005: 
149) 
 
Hedström‟s modelling does not deal specifically with power, which is probably too 
inexplicit a concept for him. However, there is nonetheless a nod in the direction 
of the power that arises between people in his acknowledgement of the 
significance of the structure of social interaction, by which we take to mean our 
ability to affect each other in social relationships.  
 
His work is extremely stimulating since it problematises a number of taken for 
granted assumptions but from a clearly natural science based position. Firstly it 
undermines the concept of linear cause and effect and predictability: history, 
context and power are of profound significance to what actually happens in global 
social patterning. This has important implications for the idea of evidence-based 
management, or best practice, if the notion is that examples of good practice can 
simply be replicated, or scaled up, elsewhere and are likely to be equally 
successful. It makes much more fragile the predictability of social development 
interventions, even those based on previous experience. Secondly, the method 
points to the importance of a fine-grained attention to every day processes for 
understanding how social patterning arises. When we are dealing with a simplified 
and reductive abstraction such as a log-frame, it will tell us very little about the 
day to day practice from which it is abstracted and what becomes necessary to 
sustain the abstraction. This attention to daily practice should concern us if we 
want to take into account both ends and means of our social development 
intentions. And thirdly, even paying attention to micro-processes may ultimately 
give no indication of how social change will eventually come about. Hedström 
himself says that it is „even more difficult to convince others, that the large scale 
phenomena that are observed may simply be due to an uncommon combination 
of common events and circumstances,‟ by which he offers his own definition of 
emergence. 
 
Emergence as complex responsive processes 
In setting out their theory of complex responsive processes, Stacey (2007), 
Griffin (2002) and Shaw (2002) draw both on the traditions of Western thought 
by way of Hegel, G.H. Mead and Norbert Elias (some of Elias‟ theories have been 
set out above) and analogies from complexity theory at the same time.  
 
Stacey draws on Mead (1934) and Elias (2000) and  the insights from the theory 
of complex adaptive systems, to make the case that global population wide 
patterns emerge only out of the local interactions of individual agents. There is a 
simultaneous, paradoxical emergence of local and global for which there is no 
overall plan and of which no one is in control. In making an analogy between 
complex adaptive systems theory and the dynamics within organisations Stacey 
and colleagues develop the idea that population wide patterns of activity emerge 
in the interplay of desires and intentions of people who are cooperating and 
competing with each other through communicative interaction: 
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In other words, in local communicative interaction, local patterns of 
interaction are being formed by population-wide patterns – generalisations 
and idealisations – while at the same time forming them. Pattern is 
emerging locally and globally at the same time, all in local communication 
in which the interplay of intentions making particular to a particular 
situation that which is general and idealised. (Stacey, 2007: 309) 
 
Themes of organising build up over time, and are turned into mission and vision 
statements, and policy documents. They can also inform the structure of what 
Mead calls social objects, those generalised tendencies developed by large groups 
of people to act in a particular way, like an organisational away-day or an AGM. 
Themes of organising and artefacts of organisation get taken up by staff as 
imaginative idealisations of the „whole‟ organisation. The way these idealisations 
are discussed between people in particular ways, constrained as they are by 
relationships of power, offers the potential for both continuity and change. 
 
Similarities and differences in theories of emergence 
Like Hedström, Stacey argues that it is in daily interactions that the global 
patterning arises, and that small differences between locally interacting agents 
can eventually have unpredictably large population-wide effects. Both have a 
more or less explicit theory of power, or socially structured configuration, for 
explaining the dramatic differences that can arise from similar activities. Both 
undermine the idea of linear cause and effect by drawing in their own ways from 
the natural science domain and point to the importance of history and context for 
offering explanations of what has arisen. Both stress the importance of paying 
attention to what is going on locally if we are to understand global patterning. 
 
Thereafter there are marked differences between the two. Unlike Hedström, 
Stacey does not support the case for the scientist as detached observer, but 
rather argues that actors are formed by the very processes which they are trying 
to study. As they try to influence others, they are caught up in the same 
figurations of power, with a greater or lesser ability to affect those around them. 
For this reason he takes an explicit interest in exploring paradox and does not 
subscribe to what the philosopher John Dewey (2005) calls „the spectator theory 
of knowledge‟ as perhaps would Hedström. Equally, Stacey takes an overt 
interest in narrative as a method of research, since he would argue that it better 
models the subtle, complex context-dependent nature of human interaction a 
position which is anathema to Hedström. Stacey is comfortable locating his theory 
within the natural science tradition as manifested in the newer complexity 
sciences, as well as a broader canon of Western philosophy and sociology. 
Hedström meanwhile thinks more narrowly of his natural home as being amid a 
more orthodox understanding of science. 
 
Where both lead us, however, is to a re-evaluation of our daily interactions with 
others if we are to gain a better understanding of what we think we are doing 
when we try to act together. As we deal with often idealised, abstract 
simplifications of what we are supposed to be doing, we need to be more fully 
aware that these reductive ways of knowing will inevitably shape what it is we 
pay attention to, and the way we understand the world. Nonetheless, in 
struggling with the abstractions we also begin to shape them as well, forming and 
being formed both at the same time. In developing a greater understanding of 
the unpredictable nature of organising, we will be obliged to pay greater attention 
to the broad set of data that is available to us in doing so,  the fluctuating 
relationships of power between us, and between us and other people, because 
these will significantly affect what it is possible to say and do.  
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We may also begin to question our linear concepts of time which accompany our 
linear models for managing the work – in the LF, project cycle management and 
other linear management tools, if-then causality leads us ineluctably from one 
step to another. However, as we pause to reflect on what we are doing we call 
attention to the way we are working with each other and in doing so create the 
possibility of understanding what we are doing anew. We begin to pay attention, 
in an iterative rather than a linear way, to how our thought is moving, how our 
knowledge and understanding are emerging. If we started our work with a 
particular understanding of what we were doing, now, six months into the project 
we understand what it is we are doing completely differently. We might consider 
that what we do and how we react to what we do are both important data sets for 
deciding how we might go on together. 
 
A return to the narrative 
Having sat for two days experiencing PowerPoint presentations, one after the 
other, I was asked by the group of managers if I would take the third morning to 
give my „feedback‟ on what they had been doing.  
 
We reconvened as a big group after an hour or so and all kinds of observations, 
reflections, and evaluations emerged. As a participant in the discussion I also 
offered my own. We agreed and disagreed, challenged each other, began to point 
to some of the power relationships between us and how they constrained what it 
was possible to say to each other. It was also possible to reflect more widely on 
the work and what it meant for the way this particular group of managers 
understood what they were engaged in. They themselves began to make 
connections which I, as an outsider, could not see, to reinterpret what their 
organisation was asking them to do and to destabilise their previous 
understanding. The group began to make plans about how they would organise 
the next quarterly meeting differently. 
 
In the afternoon I met with a much smaller executive group of managers to 
reflect further on what had happened in the morning. As we began to discuss 
what had happened and how this particular group was functioning, the low level 
conflict that had existed between two members of the group erupted and became 
a fierce argument, also catching up a third member of the team. We began, in 
the moment to talk about what we were experiencing there and then and how we 
might deal with it, and the personal and professional matters with which we were 
confronting each other.  
 
The outburst in the meeting reverberated for the remainder of my visit. It 
shocked some and relieved others in the team and everyone was obliged to talk 
about it, bilaterally, in small groups, formally and informally as way of coming to 
terms with what had happened. Things had shifted and we were beginning to talk 
in detail about the functioning of the team. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This article has used narrative about development management as a way of 
reflecting upon what people actually do in development organisations. This has 
been done to open up a discussion about how dominant methods for managing 
international development constrain the undertaking of development. Although 
making no universal claims that the organisation the author was working with 
was typical of all INGOs, he is nonetheless using the narrative as a way of 
particularising general trends of development management practice to see what 
we might learn from doing so. By explicitly drawing attention to the particular and 
local, a case is being made for the importance of exploring context-dependent 
examples of what happens as people try to undertake development work. And 
further, the article is pointing to the importance of reflection and reflexivity, 
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taking seriously the day to day interactions with others which are relationships of 
power. The reasons for doing so are derived from theories of emergence, which 
suggest the idea that global patterning arises solely out of the interaction 
between locally acting agents, which form the global pattern, and are formed by 
it at the same time. 
 
This method is offered as a counter to the dominant way of understanding 
development management which is heavily influenced by systems theory and a 
reduced understanding of scientific method. This privileges abstraction, 
simplification and linear cause and effect. The dominance of these ways of 
managing exercises an ideological constraint on what it is possible to say and do, 
which affects what workers pay attention to in their daily practice, as has been 
demonstrated in this article. The article makes the claim that these methods are 
reductive and tilt power relationships in favour of donors and managers who sit at 
a distance from the work, because they privilege generalised, non-contestable 
accounts of what is and is not happening. They cover over the messy business of 
achieving things with others as employees compete with each other to claim 
success. The author would argue further that they also have the potential for 
squeezing out the emergence of novelty, which, as Hedstrom and Stacey argue, 
arises solely out of local interaction. 
 
Human experience does not have a clear beginning, middle and end, whatever 
most project management methods would have us believe. Where we decide to 
cut the iterative cycle of the ongoing patterning of human interaction, and 
whether we judge this to be a success or failure reflects an ideological position. 
An illustration of what this might mean is as follows: 
 
Let us take, for example, the author‟s intervention in the team in Africa: using a 
dualistic approach, would we consider this a success or not? To flatter the 
consultant would mean cutting the interactions at the end of the workshop to 
demonstrate how the author had made a significant contribution to the 
effectiveness of the team, which was now planning a much more effective 
quarterly meeting. It was a success. However, if we were to include the 
subsequent meeting with the senior management team, the author might be 
deemed to have helped in some ways and confused in others. Was it successful or 
not? 
 
However, if we were to take an entirely different view, placing a different value 
on conflict and the messy business of working together, understanding it as a 
necessary and inevitable consequence of trying to organise, then the intervention 
was neither successful nor unsuccessful, but more or less supportive in helping 
the team make sense of what they were doing. A sounding taken from the team 
immediately after the intervention might look very different if taken a month or 
six months later, if bringing inter-team tensions to the surface of subsequently 
allowed better ways of working to emerge. 
 
Our understanding of what it is we are undertaking together changes from minute 
to minute as we interact with each other and make sense of what it is we are 
doing. The way we interact, the things we pay attention to, what it is possible to 
say to each other, will all affect the course of the work. The schemes that we use 
to understand our experience will shape what we consider to be the success of 
our enterprise. Paying attention to local interaction rehabilitates the richness of 
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